Sickness, defined as a condition of two or more successive years of cash losses, has pervaded several established industries (e.g., textiles) and important sectors (e.g., small scale) in India. In addition, a large segment of Indian industry is operating well below full capacity. If the capacity was fully utilized, government revenues by way of excise duties alone would be boosted by am estimated Rs. 100crore. To revive sick units, it is considered that an investment of more than R% 1000 crore will be required over a decade (B. M., pp. 549-50). Though policymakers, financial institutions, banks, managers, unions, and researchers are aware of the magnitude of the problem, very little systematic research seems to have been carried out on why organizations get sick and, more important, on how to revive them.
The objective of this paper is to present some useful propositions regarding the managerial processes that seem critical in reviving sick units. The propositions are based on the experience of Hindustan Photo Films (HPF), a public sector corporation that has revived spectacularly during the last four years. However, they are considered to have general validity although the manner in which they are operationalized in other companies will differ.
HPF was established in 1961 with the technical collaboration of Bauchet et Cie of Paris (which was subsequently acquired by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company) to produce a wide range of photosensitive goods: cine film positive (black and white), photographic paper, and X-ray films. From its inception, the company encountered a series of technical problems. Even before it started production, it had accumulated losses amounting to Rs. 22 crore owing to delay in commissioning and cost overruns. In terms of quality, price, and delivery (especially in X-ray films) its products did not command respect in the market. Cash losses mounted steadily and the company lost Rs. 2.6 crore on a sales turnover of Rs 4.4 crore in 1971-72. HPF thus became a "leading loser" in the public sector. In 1972 it was undoubtedly sick. Its performance in terms of capacity utilization, wages per employee, productivity per employee, quality, industrial harmony, profitability, sales growth, etc., was poor.
A series of investigating teams, including those from Kodak, Agfa, and Fuji, had suggested that it was very difficult to revive HPF and that it was saddled with obsolete technology. Negotiations were undertaken to get Kodak or Agfa involved in its revival at an estimated cost of Rs. 10-15 crore in technical fee and royalties. At the same time, plans were afoot to shift to newer products involving more advanced technologies, e.g., colour film and polyester base Xray.
However, by 1976, the picture had changed dramatically and HPF had achieved improved performance in several indicators under the a b l e l e a d e r s h i p o f M . K . R a j u w h o t o o k over as part-time Chairman in July 1972 (Appendix I). More than indicators, the products of HPF began to enjoy a high degree of acceptance within the country. In fact, HPF started exporting X-ray films to East Germany.
Proposition 1
The key to revival of a sick unit is the formulation and implementation of a new strategy. Formulation of strategy consists of matching the organization with its environment. Implementation includes the motivation and commitment of internal and external publics to the new strategy. Sick units cannot be revived by merely injecting more funds or altering procedures and practices in functional areas. Revival calls for a multidimensional view of the problem and a multipronged and internally consistent action programme.
The very first act of the new Chairman of HPF was to examine the existing strategy. He found that HPF had no strategy. It had not articulated any policy clearly and whatever policies existed were not communicated to its various constituencies, viz., employees, distributors, dealers, consumers, and the government. Consequently, there was no sense of direction in analysing problems, executing a strategy, and initiating corrective action.
Within the first three months of taking over, Raju evolved a strategy and a set of policies. The strategy he adopted in the face of severe resource constraints was well captured in the phrase "make the most of what you have." Raju's primary concern was consolidation for survival, and the key issue was whether HPF could produce a quality product with the existing facilities. While these short-term issues dominated his thinking, he was at the same time aiming to establish HPF as the "nucleus of a giant photographic industry in India." Based on his vision for HPF, he developed a set of policies, closely related to the nature of the problem that HPF had faced till then.
(a) It was decided that the company would not compromise on quality. All defective stocks were withdrawn and all dealers, distributors, and employees were advised that they should stop marketing defective or substandard products. A vigorous statistical quality control effort was mounted to improve the quality of the finished product.
(b) A programme for increasing capacity utilization to 85 per cent from the then existing level of 43 per 'cent in a period of one year was developed.
(c) Gaps in the distribution setup were filled by appointing new distributors. Targets for performance were, however, fixed for existing distributors.
(d) A programme for cost reduction was for mulated which included reduction in scrap levels and the recovery of silver and sol vents from waste materials at an estimated saving of Rs. 75 lakh within a year.
(e) To involve managers in the process of revival, management conferences were organized at periodic intervals to discuss the problems at HPF and the related action plans.
(/) While emphasis was placed on fuller utilization of existing capacity, it was decided to add capacity for X-ray films and to convert (rather than manufacture) cine colour film.
(g) A long-term policy on R and D, primarily geared towards product development, was initiated. We see thus that there was an attempt to develop a consistent set of action plans simultaneously in a number of areas, all aimed at the revival of HPF.
While a strategy was thus being evolved the management had to gain broadbased support from several important constituencies for its action plan before results could be obtained. (0 The unions were informed of the overall strategy for revival. In other words, not only was a clear strategy formulated but it was communicated to all relevant internal and external groups. The communication to these groups was consistent and credible. In a very short time, actions taken by the various groups became consistent with the framework of overall strategy.
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Proposition 2
Localizing problems and sequencing actions are important in the revival of sick units.
Several instances in HPF's revival illustrate the need for localizing problems and sequencing actions. One of the early decisions of the HPF board was to continue with the existing distribution setup, much against internal and external pressures to take over distribution. The rationale for this decision was clear. HPF in 1972 was a company with serious liquidity problems and little depth in management. It could not, irrespective of what the intentions were, manage to achieve a high level of performance in manufacturing and marketing simultaneously. Improved quality and fuller capacity utilization were given highest priority and all available managerial resources were directed towards these goals. Hence, it was decided to continue the existing channels of distribution.
Yet another example is jumbo roll conversion. Conversion is the last stage in photo film manufacture (Appendix II). In the past, HPF had occasionally imported jumbo rolls and converted them for distribution. This was conceived initially in terms of "trial marketing." Owing to stringent import restrictions, jumbo roll conversion was always an ad hoc activity even though its potential as a buffer in case of manufacturing crises had been recognized. With the new strategy, jumbo roll conversion was taken up in a big way with the support of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting which looked after the interests of the movie industry. Some key managers,members of the trade,and officials in theMinistry of Industries argued, however, that HPF was set up to manufacture film and not merely to convert jumbo rolls. In the end, jumbo roll conversion turned out to have the following positive effects: (a) it generated cash flow for internal growth; (b) it induced confidence among managers and boosted their morale; (c) it tested the capacity of the conversion department as well as the capacity of the market to absorb additional quantities of film; (d) it established HPF as a reliable supplier of film, thus generating confidence among user groups and dealers; and (e) it helped to isolate the problem areas in manufacturing, viz., emulsion and coating departments. As manufacturing problems in emulsions and coating were sorted out, the amount of jumbo rolls converted as a percentage of total production came down to 25 per cent in 1976.
Proposition 3
The ability to implement the revival strategy successfully depends on the creation of an organizational context that is conducive to performance.
By context we mean the net effect of various tools and techniques normally associated with management in an organization. It includes organization structure, choice of key people, systems of budgeting and control, training, performance evaluation and career progression systems, rewards, and forums for participation like committees, task forces, work councils, and suggestion schemes.
Thus, the tools available to senior managers to achieve desired goals are many. However, the key to inducing performance is the process by which these tools are blended to create a "context" in the organization that facilitates performance. There are no readymade answers on how to blend these tools and techniques. Context has to suit a specific purpose and a specific situation. The history of the organization, the nature and extent of controls that exist, the ability and commitment of its managers and work force, and the personality and style of the chief executive-all these factors will influence' the choice of tools and techniques.
Several specific steps were taken at HPF to create an appropriate context. First, in keeping with its strategy, a decision was made to continue with the then existing management team. This contrasts with the western approach to revival in which the first casualties are the senior managers of the organization. Senior managers represent emotional and intellectual commitments to the old strategy and, therefore, the formulation and implementation of a new strategy requires a fresh start. At HPF, however, the new strategy was developed by the chief executive and it was implemented by persuading the existing management team. Executives who felt uncomfortable in the new context and its performance orientation left the organization in two to three years. The blood bath, so commonly associated with revival, was unnecessary.
Second, very few changes were made in the organization structure. One was the creation of the position of Process Controller at senior operating level. There were few other changes of a structural nature. Whenever people were moved from one position or level to another, suitable structural adjustments were made. In other words, "people" rather than "structural" changes were made.
Third, the performance evaluation system was completely changed for all supervisory and managerial staff from a confidential report format to a performance appraisal and personal development format. Even at the shopfloor level, seniority-based promotion was replaced by a merit-based promotion system supported by trade tests. Merit and performance were given more recognition than before. In addition to these changes, an extensive training programme was introduced at all levels. Several operating level executives were sent to the collaborator's plants abroad for refresher training for the first time in almost ten years. All supervisors and several operators were given training within the organization. Some workers were sent abroad for training and familiarization. As a result, the concern for performance as well as the ability to perform at all levels improved.
Proposition 4
Profits are a legitimate goal towards which the sick unit's revival efforts may be usefully directed.
Official thinking seems agreed on the point that sickness in industry is a function of unprofitable operations. Other important factors such as capacity utilization and workers laid off have to be considered. But, in the ultimate analysis, losses will continue to be the fundamental measure of sickness in industry.
The reason why profit is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) index of corporate performance is easy to understand. Financial accounting is after all the "language of business," although it has well-known limitations. For instance, not only does it exclude from its purview those activities which are not amenable to expression in terms of money, but is further restricted to events in which a specific financial exchange is involved. Moreover, money does not prove to be as common a denominator as one would imagine because of the differences in its purchasing power over time.
At HPF, the revival plan launched in 1972 was explicitly geared to achieving, first, breakeven and, then, a stable level of profit. Management determined that a sales figure of Rs. 1 crore a month for the remainder of the year was necessary just to breakeven. Simultaneously, all possible avenues for cost reduction and waste elimination were investigated systematically. Thus, we see the power of the profit goal in focusing, coordinating, and dovetailing efforts towards revival. As operations gradually stabilized, the profit goal was extended to lower and lower levels of the organization. At present a system exists by which even sections know what their weekly contribution to HPF's profitability is. In effect, profit serves as a barometer of corporate morale.
Profit not only serves a short-run purpose of inducing and focusing the revival strategy but it also has a long-runp urpose. At HPF, the long-
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run purpose was to generate adequate funds for growth to the ultimate state envisioned by the chief executive. As long as the organization was complacent about its role in the Indian economy, heavy losses on a year-to-year basis did not seem to matter very much, especially since it was in the public sector. But in the light of the new Chairman's strategy, profitable operations were a necessity.
Thus jumbo roll conversion, which in the short-run boosted the rates of capacity utilization, served in the long-run to generate badly needed funds for the company's growth. Moreover, attempts to achieve cost reduction in every possible sphere were aimed at attaining not just national but global standards of competition in the photo film industry. Factors such as silver weight per square metre of film, solvent losses per kilogram of base, rejection rates, and scrap rates had to be brought to levels which would make HPF's costs, and hence profitability, comparable to those of giants in the field such as Kodak, Fuji, and Du Pont.
It is, however, illusory to assume that the mere adoption of profits as a desirable goal in the revival process will enable an organization to solve all its problems. In fact, the hurdles actually encountered in achieving profitable operations may be extremely problematic as it in fact proved to be for HPF and (not untypically) for most other sick-units. For one thing, the inflationary period through which HPF went (1972-74) during the revival period made unitcost forecasting virtually impossible while unit prices, for competitive reasons and on account of prevailing government guidelines, could be adjusted upwards only with great difficulty.
The public sector enterprises such as HPF, moreover face the hazards of profit, forecasting in a setup where the government's financial and accounting policies create peculiar complications. To cite an example, take the mechanistic application of 1 : 1 debt to equity ratio. Because of this, an ordinarily highly capital intensive business like HPF became saddled with excruciating interest payment burdens even while it was trying to find its feet. Because HPF was making cash losses (i.e., after interest but before depreciation) it had to go on accumulating government debt and increasing its interest burden (virtually a compulsory dividend to the owners!). In the private sector such a state of affairs would have triggered at least a re-capitalization of the company. It was, however, only in 1975-76 that HPF could avail of this relief through the conversion of Rs. 10 crore of debt into equity by the government. If HPF's operations had not stabilized as well as they had, it is doubtful if the government would have taken even this step.
The inability even to start off with a (relatively) clean slate in the public sector makes accumulated losses a perennial albatross around the management's neck. Conservatism with respect to writeoffs coexists with ample flexibility in regard to writebacks (e.g., depreciation and other provisions no longer required; refunds of customs duties, sales taxes, harbour dues, excise duties; government subsidies; and waiver of penal interest). Such adjustments are so numerous and in relation to the net profit figure so significant as to make words like "profit" and "accounting" all but meaningless. While the significance of forecasting a specific profit figure is to be discounted, we nevertheless maintain that it is essential to aim at profitable operations as a goal during the revival process and after operations are stabilized.
Proposition 5
Revival of a sick unit requires the commitment of managers and employees of the organization. Openness in management process is essential for gaining commitment.
Currently, there is a substantial amount of debate in the press and amongst policymakers and researchers on worker participation in industry. It centers on legislative and other mechanisms t h a t c a n b e u s e d t o a c h i e v e i t . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , i t i s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d that managers participate in management. In our experience, managers participate much less in management than is commonly believed. Very few lower level managers in an organization know what the strategy is and how their actions fit in the overall framework for achieving organizational goals.
One of the interesting features of the HPF experience, as we have seen, was that a clear strategy was initiated very early for involving managers and workers in the revival process and subsequent management. Regular management conferences were held to outline the problems faced by the organization as well as to publicize the successes it had achieved. Themes such as "consolidation for survival," ''stability, continuity and growth," and "programmed cost improvement"were chosen for these annual conferences.
It was also common for managers to participate in a variety of task forces investigating specific problems with time bound targets to be achieved. For example, four task forces were organized during October 1972 to investigate the following aspects:
(a) inventory control; (b) programmed cost improvement; (c) process improvement; and (d) new product development. Committees were effectively used to bring together managers at lower levels to discuss problems of the organization as well as to initiate corrective action and/or to make recommendations to the top management and the board. As a result, managers started appreciating over a period of time the key roles they played in achieving overall company objectives, irrespective of their level in the hierarchy or their functional responsibility. In other words, they could find an answer to that persistent and emotionally charged question: "Where do I fit in and what is my contribution?" Shopfloor councils were established at all departmental and sub-departmental levels under the chairmanship of the department head for discussing problems at each level: production, quality, and working conditions. At the same time, workers were also kept aware of costs. Every section was aware of its achievement for the week in terms of contribution to the overall profitability of the company. This openness and the desire to involve workers in the decision-making process helped to create a sense of commitment to the success of the revival strategy.
Involvement was generated not only through the dissemination of factual data but also by actively soliciting help, guidance, and commitment of a large group of people in formulating and implementing decisions. Involvement and participation were not seen as gimmicks but as ingredients which were critical to the success of the programme.
Proposition 6
Visibility or openness of the managerial process leads to confidence in the top management and its strategy even before results are forthcoming.
When a financial crisis hits an organization, the first casualty is openness in management, the visibility of facts and agreement regarding the nature and magnitude of problems the organization is facing. It is commonly believed that an airing of the problem and its magnitude will scare investors, bankers, managers, and distributors, and demoralize employees. In our view, it is precisely during such crises that an organization has to communicate clearly and completely with all parties concerned. This step ensures that everyone understands the nature and magnitude of the problem as well as what their role is in the resolution of the problem.
An open system was created at HPF to apprise and keep informed the relevant outside groups with problems. A press and media advertising
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strategy was evolved for this purpose. Through press conferences the public was informed of the plans at HPF for achieving results. Once the previously announced plans were achieved, media advertising was used to communicate the achievement. For example, as early as October 1972, the Chairman announced at a press conference that the quality of X-ray films would improve. As the manufacturing process for X-ray films got stabilized and the quality improved, an advertising campaign was launched. In these advertisements, the quality of X-ray films was certified by leading radiologists. A similar approach was adopted for black and white cine film positives.
The Minister and the Ministry were also kept fully acquainted with problems at HPF. The ministers visited HPF several times and, on these occasions, production and sales targets were announced in the presence of press representatives. This also served to commit the organization to difficult tasks.
Proposition 7
In most cases and especially in industries based on sophisticated technology, performance is closely linked to management discipline in several areas. Inadequate attention to details leads to breakdown of the system over time.
Industries based on advanced technology and those having continuous process require sophisticated control system at the operating level. At HPF, one of the major problems that led to poor quality, according to several investigating teams, was lack of cleanliness. To make high quality photo sensitive products, cleanliness of a much higher order than that found in pharmaceutical factories is required. Elaborate precautions had to be taken to ensure even the purity of air and water inside the factory.
Yet another sphere where strict discipline was necessary was in the area of process changes. No parameter of production, i.e., raw material quality, quantity, and in many cases the source and batch of materials, could be altered on ad hoc basis. But before 1972 there was a tendency at HPF to experiment with emulsion formulations ignoring the fact that emulsion quality was very sensitive to parametric changes. One of the first things stressed by the Du Pont technicians who were engaged to stabilize the emulsion formula for X-ray films was the need for stringent control on raw material as well as process changes. For example, raw material received from the same source but belonging to different batches was carefully monitored for its effect on emulsion quality.
Management discipline also applied to the discussion of problems and the undertaking of concerted action. For instance, the operating committee met regularly every week to discuss manufacturing problems. Moreover, information on production, quality, and cost was given to the members of the operating committee in a specified format. In other words, both the issues to be discussed and the time for discussion were fixed. This discipline indicated to the operating managers that they could not allow problems to accumulate and alerted all concerned to emerging problems at the earliest possible opportunity. Closely related to the operating committee, the work councils carried the problem solving discipline further down the line.
The application of statistical techniques in process control generated a healthy regard for the use of quantitative data and valuable appreciation for analytical ways of looking at operating problems. These were major changes at HPF. In other words, they demonstrated to theorganization that a sophisticated technology required a correspondingly greater control over the process.
Proposition 8
The solution to technological problems does not necessarily lie in changing or upgrading hardware alone. Often the solution requires a combination of hardware (equipment) and soft-ware (expertise) for optimum utilization of the equipment.
The equipment at HPF was widely regarded as obsolete. Around 1971, both HPF management as well as the government were eagerly seeking new technology. No attempts were made to isolate those aspects of the existing technology which were causing problems. Relatively fewer problems existed in the quality of cine film and photographic paper compared to the serious quality problems in X-ray films. Further, HPF had solved its problem in base casting and conversion departments. The remaining problems consisted of finding an acceptable emulsion formulation for X-ray films and stabilizing the coating operations for X-ray films. Essentially, the problems centered on one product and two critical operations.
HPF decided to import polyester film base from Du Pont, a leading producer of X-ray films, and to employ two Du Pont technicians to develop emulsions and a coating technique that would improve the quality of X-ray films to international standards. Since Du Pont considered that no proprietary technology was involved, its assistance was provided virtually free of cost and yet significantly improved emulsion formulations of X-ray films. In two years, HPF was also able to i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i o n r a t e f o r X -r a y films in the coating department from five metres to 16 metres a minute with minor modifications to equipment. This implied that the available capacity for coating X-ray films was increased more than three fold. HPF planned to increase the production rate to 19 metres a minute in 1977-78.
Improvements in the quality of X-ray films implied that a certain understanding of emulsion technology, which is ordinarily highly proprietary, was also transferred to Indian technicians. This knowledge was not capital intensive (i.e., embodied in equipment) but represented an understanding of procedures and problem-solving methodology.
More important, the problem-solving methodology acquired by HPF technicians helped in initiating changes in manufacturing and process improvements in other products. Similarly, process control techniques for coating X-ray films were found useful for improving other products as well with the same equipment and people.
Proposition 9
Consultants can play a very valuable role in developing an accurate understanding of the problems facing the organization as well as in implementing changes.
While consultants are frequently engaged for assessing problems and suggesting solutions (especially when an organization is sick), they are seldom engaged to implement a clearly defined programme which is an integral part of the overall revival strategy. Carefully chosen consultants can easily supplement internal skills in the initial stages of revival.
A consultant's assistance in personnel and labour relations was sought to develop an understanding of the key problems facing HPF. He helped to organize HPF management for negotiating an equitable wage settlement with the trade union. He also helped management to develop training programmes for operators, supervisors, and managers of the company. This was a major exercise in realizing the potential of the personnel function and it was carried out over three years. The same consultant continued to work with operating managers to ensure that they understood and contributed to the rationale for changes which were being introduced.
Another important area where consultants were employed was in Statistical Quality Control (SQC). The Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) was intimately involved in introducing process controls and SQC concepts on a plant wide basisfrom raw material acceptance to quality control over finished goods. Representatives of ISI worked closely with operating managers in process control and production departments and thus contributed to significant changes in the operating culture.
Consultants perform yet another role: they train managers on the job. The examples cited above illustrate the use of consultants in the implementation of a revival strategy. It is clearly an approach to supplementing internally available skills without uncomfortably long lead times.
Proposition 10
The active and visible support given to the chief executive by the appointing authorities is critical for the implementation of the revival strategy.
The chief executive who undertakes to revive a sick unit has an unenviable job to perform. In most cases (HPF included), the problems are multidimensional and their resolution involves a substantial amount of emotional and intellectual stress. Active support of the appointing authorities (in the case of a public sector company, the Minister/Ministry) is crucial for revival. In the case of HPF, the Minister for Industries not only supported the actions taken by the Chairman but emphasized it through visits to the plant and press statements.
Revival also requires the chief executive to make hard, and sometimes unpopular, choices. This may be in the form of selecting key people, or choosing a set of policies which does not have popular support. Strained relations with the trade are not uncommon. Disagreement over the nature of future plans can be expected. All these problems arose in HPF from time to time. The support of the Minister and the Ministry was crucial for the Chairman in implementing his decisions.
The chief executive in a sick unit is also vulnerable to public criticism. Even today, HPF experiences attempts to rake up issues which will directly or indirectly attract the attention of the government and parliament to the management of the company. Public criticism of the chief executive can often paralyse the operations of the organization especially if it follows a key decision but precedes results. It is important that appointing authorities adopt a sympathetic view of the vulnerability of the chief executive. If they have second thoughts on the capability and integrity of the chief executive his credibility is undermined.
Proposition 11
The importance of leadership in reviving sick units cannot be underestimated.
Leadership provides a locus for action in sick units. It is simultaneously a source of inspiration and ideas as well as a rallying point for action. However, the issue of leadership is difficult to deal with in isolation from the changes that leadership brings along with it. The literature either glorifies the role of the chief executive and overplays the importance of charisma or totally ignores the importance of leadership by emphasizing the importance of technology, finance, and systems and procedures. In our view, the importance of leadership cannot be underestimated.
At the same time, leadership which does not pay attention to important details in several areas of management mentioned earlier would prove inadequate for revival.
The success story of HPF cannot be separated from the impact of its Chairman since his enthusiasm and involvement pervaded all its operations. His role was one of a catalyst, idea generator, and motivator. Obviously, he could not have carried out changes by himself; at the same time, these changes could not have been triggered without his leadership.
Leadership plays the following important roles in reviving a sick unit: (a) it generates confidence in the employees that the organization can and will be revived; (b) it ensures that adequate information to analyse the nature of problems and assess courses of future action is forthcoming; (c) it helps the assessment of internal or exter-nal sources of assistance; (d) it secures the confidence of external constituencies like the Ministry, trade, collaborators, and the general public; (e) it identifies and supports talented employees wherever they may be within the organization; and (/) it elicits the commitment of a variety of groups to the overall vision or the longterm strategy of the organization. The HPF experience provides a good example of a Chairman fulfilling all these roles. He was very much involved in the initial stages in providing guidance to operating managers and establishing management discipline. At the same time, he was determined to generate internal capabilities among managers so that these changes could be sustained. In the initial stages, he visited HPF every week and attended every operating committee meeting. However, in recent years, his role has reverted to a strategic one.
Conclusion
What are the implications of these propositions for the turnaround manager? Four issues may be cited: 1. The importance of a strategy. 2. The importance of the quality of managerial process. 3. The importance of acquiring and developing basic competence. 4. The importance of top level support.
Strategy : The process of revival cannot be initiated without a clear strategy, articulation of policies, isolation of problems, and sequencing of actions. Moreover, strategy for revival is, in a real sense, the result of a series of negotiations with key interest groups such as trade, distributors, labour unions, financial institutions, and the government. Bower (1970) has highlighted the importance of internal "political" processes strategy making. The revival process as we have seen, requires an extension of this concept to external constituencies also. In fact, the traditional distinction between external and internal constituents seems to have less relevance (particularly for public enterprises) when viewed in this light.
Quality of managerial processes: What we have discussed till now, viz., management discipline, performance orientation, career progression, employee participation, and involvement of managers, essentially adds up to a change in the organization culture. In HPF the change was from an administrative to an industrial culture. The leadership provided by a professional manager with industrial background and profit orientation played a paramount role in this process. A concomitant of this was the openness and visibility of managerial process. It was this combination which to a great extent resulted in the support of internal and external publics to the revival strategy.
Managerial use of resources: The literature on revival tends to concentrate only on the use of financial, personnel, and material resources. The revival process which HPF experienced brings to light certain other important resources that have often to be acquired from scratch, especially in the context of national economic development. The acquisition of basic competence in areas such as management and technological knowhow (as opposed to the purchase of hardware) is the most important of these. The HPF turnaround exemplifies how effective use was made of foreign collaborators both in the knowhow and knowwhy areas and of consultants in the personnel andSQCfunctions. Similarly, an advertising agency was used effectively to communicate to key publics like the trade, government, and employees through the media.
Support of higher authorities:
The revival period is a trying one for an organization necessitating the taking of many hard and often unpopular decisions. In these times, the support of higher authorities and the continued maintenance of rapport is crucial for the success of the revival effort.
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The specifics of the way a turnaround is engineered will depend on the peculiarities of the organization. Nevertheless, the revival of a sick unit offers rich lessons for managers and scholars alike. For managers, it is frequently the "moment of truth" when all their skills have to be brought to a sharp focus. For scholars, it sheds a great deal of light on corporate strategy and particularly on strategy implementation. SILVER
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